We characterise optimal fiscal policies in a tractable Dynamic General Equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government has access to consumption taxation, as alternative to labour income taxation. We show that using consumption taxation is welfare superior as this tax component acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policy-maker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher with consumption taxes than with labour income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these welfare gains by calibrating the model on the US economy.
Introduction
What are the benefits from taxing consumption? We answer this question by studying Ramsey fiscal policies in a tractable and deterministic dynamic general equilibrium model that abstracts from capital accumulation, where firms have monopolistic power, public spending directly increases households' utility and the government balances its budget by levying distortionary linear labour income and consumption taxes (but no lump-sum taxes) and by issuing risk-less bonds.
Compared to a scenario where only labour income taxes are available, we identify and quantify two benefits of taxing consumption. First, consumption taxation serves as indirect taxation of inefficient profits. We call this the intratemporal gains of taxing consumption. These intratemporal gains increase with the monopolistic power of firms and disappear under perfect competition. Second, consumption taxation helps to manage more efficiently the price of public debt, via direct manipulations of the households' Euler equation. We call this the intertemporal gains of taxing consumption. These intertemporal gains grow with the initial level of public debt and vanish when the initial level of debt is zero. In a numerical exercise aimed to replicate some salient features of the US economy, we find that both gains are quantitatively important. These gains hold under some important extensions of the baseline model, such as non-separability between leisure and consumption and complementarity-substitutability between private and public spending.
Furthermore we show that compared to a scenario where only labour income taxes are available, these two characteristics of consumption taxation allow the policy-maker to set a higher government spending-to-income ratio. For the special case of separable preferences, we are able to present a set of analytical conditions on the optimal provisions of public goods. In particular, if households hold logarithmic preferences in private and public consumption, the optimal share of public-to-private consumption is at the efficient level under consumption taxes, while the same ratio is lower under labour income taxation, and it gets smaller the higher the monopolistic power of firms.
From this, the main contributions and novelties of this paper lay in quantifying and disentangling the different gains from taxing consumption and from presenting a set of analytical conditions on the optimal provision of public spending. Our model sacrifices complexity so that our results may be conveyed transparently, and so that we may obtain analytical results. This paper links to the existing literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the literature that studies the welfare gains of taxing consumption. The closest contribution can be found in Coleman (2000) , who finds, in a deterministic model with capital accumulation and perfect competition, that replacing income taxes with consumption taxes would lead to large welfare gains in the United States. Correia (2010) extends this result to a heterogeneous-agents framework. Two recent contributions highlight the role of consumption taxation as a tool to relax a constraint of the monetary authority on the nominal interest rate, either as a result of the zero lower bound (Correia, Farhi, Nicolini, and Teles, 2013) or in a monetary union (Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhoki, 2014) . However none of these contributions highlights and quantifies the interactions of consumption taxation with monopolistic power, public debt and government spending.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the optimal provision of public goods. Adam (2011) analyses optimal government spending in a New Keynesian model with labour income taxation and finds that, as here, public spending-to-income ratio fall short of its first best level. Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008) study the provision of public spending in a Real Business Cycle model with labour income taxation when the policy-maker may or may not be able to commit to future policies. They find that the optimal share of public spending-to-income is higher under commitment. However this literature does not consider the role of consumption taxation in shaping the optimal provision of public good.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 presents the policy analysis.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Model
We present a discrete time, flexible price economy, with linear technology in labour, without uncertainty nor capital accumulation, where firms have monopolistic power. The benevolent government finances an endogenously determined level of government spending (g t ) through a proportional labour income tax (τ h t ∈ (−∞, 1)), a linear consumption tax (τ c t ∈ (−1, ∞)) and by issuing a one-period discount bond (b t+1 ). Its budget constraint is
where c t is private consumption, w t are real wages, h t represents labour supply and p b t is the ex-ante real bond price. We consider two versions of the model: The first version allows only for for labour income taxation and debt, while the second version allows only for consumption taxation and debt. While we describe the model with all of these fiscal instruments, it should be understood that a subset of them are set to zero in any version of the model.
The representative household takes prices and policies as given, chooses consumption, savings via public bond holding (b t+1 ), and leisure ( t ), with the standard time constraint, 1 = h t + t , in order to maximise the expected discounted value of her lifetime utility, i.e.
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The utility function in (2) is separable across time, twice continuously differentiable, with a constant Frisch elasticity of labour supply. Furthermore we assume that utility is increasing in its three arguments, that is u c,t > 0, u ,t > 0 and u g,t > 0, concave, i.e. u cc,t < 0, u ,t < 0 and u gg,t < 0, and that allows for non-separability between leisure and consumption and complementarity/substitutability between private and public spending. We indicate respectively with u x,t and u xx,t the first and the second partial derivatives of u t with respect to the generic variable x at time t.
Consistently with these properties, we specify the per-period utility function as,
where α ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative utility weight on private consumption, ϕ is the (constant) Frisch elasticity of labour supply, κ is the utility weight of leisure and σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and the relative risk aversion parameter. From (3) it follows that u cg is < ( >, = ) 0 if and only if σ is > ( <, = ) 1. The latter condition means that when the current-period utility function u(.) exhibits strong (weak) curvature, c and g are Edgeworth substitutes (complements), see Ni (1995) .
Both private and public consumption baskets consist of constant-elasticity of substitution aggregators of individual goods i, i.e. c t =
, where > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The household's budget constraint can be written as
where d t are the aggregate profits rebated from the monopolistic competitive producers. The household's optimal behaviour is characterised by the following first order conditions
, ∀t,
and
Examining the household's first-order conditions, the different distortions caused by the two tax instruments become apparent. The labour income tax distorts the (intratemporal) consumption-leisure margin, (5). The current consumption tax distorts the same margin. In addition, both the current and next period's consumption tax enters into the current (forward-looking) Euler equation, (6).
We now present the supply side of the economy. Each of the differentiated goods i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by one monopolistic firm who employs labour using a linear production technology y i,t = h i,t , where y i,t is the output of the generic firm i. 
Ramsey Policy
Our policy exercise starts by defining the efficient allocation of the model. 
Definition 2 (First Best
Proof. The proof is straightforward. First let us substitute the production function into the market clearing condition to eliminate y t and have a single constraint to the maximisation problem. Then by taking the first order conditions and combining them through the Lagrangian multiplier, we obtain (7).
Where a variable with the superfix sp indicates its level in the Social Planner (or first best) allocation.
In the first best equilibrium the marginal utilities of private and public consumption must equate the marginal utility of leisure. This simple allocation rule is optimal because it is equally costly to produce public and private consumption goods.
Definition 3 (Ramsey Problem). The Ramsey policy-maker maximises (2) over the decentralised equilibria. A Ramsey outcome is a decentralised allocation that attains the maximum of (2).
Compared to the Social Planner, the Ramsey Planner faces three inefficiencies. First, the Planner has to balance its budget by using distortive taxation, which means that the government has to sacrifice resources in order to finance its expenditure. Second the presence of monopolistic competition creates, via the real wages, an inefficient wedge between the marginal utility of leisure and the marginal utility of consumption. This generates a shortage in the supply of labour. Third, the Planner has to deal with the burden of a positive level of debt, which increases the government financing needs, further deteriorates resources and creates a time inconsistency problem. Our exercise aims to study how the Ramsey policymaker trades off these inefficiencies in order to maximise welfare.
We will now present the policy problems for different fiscal financing schemes, i.e. labour income vs. consumption taxation. Following the literature, e.g. Lucas and Stokey (1983) , we adopt a primal approach, meaning that we express the policy problems in terms of allocations rather than tax rates.
Labour Income Taxation. In the model with solely labour income taxes, i.e. τ c t = 0 ∀t, for a given initial level of debt (b 0 ), the Ramsey Planner maximises equation (2), subject to the aggregate feasibility constraint (1 − t = c t + g t ) and the implementability constraint 1
Taking derivatives to the associated Lagrangean problem, the optimality conditions are
where u xy,t indicate the cross derivatives of the generic variables x and y at time t, while λ t ≥ 0 and γ t ≥ 0 denote the Lagrange multipliers attached to the feasibility and the implementability constraints, respectively.
Consumption Taxation. Similar to the previous case, with consumption taxes, i.e. τ h t = 0 ∀t, for a given initial level of debt (b 0 ), the Ramsey Planner maximises equation (2), subject to the aggregate feasibility constraint (1 − t = c t + g t ) and the implementability constraint
Importantly, (12) and (17) imply that γ t must be constant ∀t > 0. As presented in Lucas and Stokey (1983) , in this class of models the steady-state level of debt is not determined. Given that in the equilibrium γ t must be constant, all the remaining conditions are identical ∀t ≥ 1, and so do the values of c, g, , and b. Thus, the steady-state allocations depend on γ. Equations (10) and (16) However, under the two different tax instruments, the Ramsey Planner faces different implementability constraints, i.e. (8) versus (13). This implies that, given the same initial level of public debt b 0 , and the structural parameters of the economy, the allocations along the transition and in turn the welfare properties of the two policy scenarios will be in general different. The aim of this policy exercise is to explore these differences.
Analytical Results
We study a version of the model where the instantaneous utility is separable in its three arguments, i.e. σ = 1, see equation (3). In this case, all cross derivatives are equal to zero, e.g. u cg = 0 (c and g are Edgeworth independent), and
Given these functional forms, the First Best allocation presented in Proposition 1 specialises to
This model restriction is instructive as it helps to develop transparent economic intuitions through a set of analytical insights. In turn, these insights will allow us to disentangle the effects of each inefficiency faced by the Ramsey Planner on the optimal allocations under the two fiscal financing schemes.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Policy with Labour Income Taxation).
Under labour income taxation, given a generic positive level of initial outstanding debt, b 0 , and the conditions on the Lagrangean multiplier γ t , the Ramsey allocation is described by the implementability constraint (8),
and (ii)
Proof. See Appendix.
We begin the explanation of Proposition 2 by considering the simplest case of the model with labour income taxation, no debt (b t = 0 ∀t) and no monopolistic competition ( → ∞), i.e. where the only inefficiency is represented by distortionary taxation. First, as in (19), this inefficiency creates a wedge,
between the marginal utility of government spending and the marginal utility of leisure, as labour supply and total production are reduced by taxation below their efficient levels.
Second, the Ramsey allocation becomes time-invariant, i.e. the absence of public debt eliminates the time inconsistency problem of the government. As a result, equation (20) is the same at time 0 and for all subsequent periods. Third, equation (20) shows that the optimal steady-state ratio of public to private consumption is equal to the one chosen in the efficient allocation, even though labour supply is distorted by income taxation. It should be noted that this latter result does not hold in general and depends, in particular, on the utility function where the substitution and the income effects of government spending on labour supply cancel each other out. The logarithmic utility function we have chosen is particularly instructive, as it produces the first best choice of public to private consumption, if there are tax distortions but no monopolistic competition nor public debt. This allows to show how the introduction of these two inefficiencies deviates from this choice.
We now add monopolistic competition ( < ∞) to the previous case. First, this creates an additional wedge in (19), whose strength crucially depends on , i.e.
, and generates a further decrease in the total production, as prices now exceed marginal costs. Second, the presence of monopolistic competition introduces a new wedge between marginal utility of public and private consumption, see equation (20). This is because the extra inefficiency represented by untaxed profits interacts with distortionary taxation, making, other things equal, the substitution effect on labour supply stronger than its income effect. As a result, the Ramsey planner decreases government spending (relative to private consumption) below its efficient level, thus lowering taxation and in turn shrinking the inefficient wedge between consumption and leisure.
Finally, we consider a situation with perfect competition ( → ∞) and positive initial level of public debt (b 0 > 0). The presence of public debt introduces a time inconsistency problem in the Ramsey allocation, whose strength depends crucially on the initial level of outstanding debt, i.e. (20) is different at time 0 and in any subsequent period. This is due to the Planner's incentive to manipulate the bond price on the initial level of debt. In a generic period t ≥ 1, current consumption influences both bond prices at time t and at t − 1. As a consequence, if the government uses taxes and public expenditure to increase the price of the bond at time t, other things equal, the bond price at time t − 1 decreases. Instead at t = 0 consumers' savings and previous bond price are given. Therefore, if the government inherits a positive level of debt, it can benefit from an increase in the price of the bond at time 0 without incurring any additional cost. Equation (20) shows that this is implemented by increasing the ratio of private to public consumption at time 0 above its efficient level, where the increase is proportional to the initial level of public debt, b 0 . This policy implies lower initial taxes and higher demand for saving, thus allowing the government to sell its bonds at a more convenient price.
We now turn our attention to the case where only consumption taxation is available to the Ramsey Planner.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Policy with Consumption Taxation). Under consumption taxation, given a generic positive level of initial outstanding debt b 0 and the conditions on the Lagrangian multiplier γ t , the Ramsey allocation is described by the implementability constraint (13),
With perfect competition and no public debt, the optimal allocation under consumption taxation mimics the one under labour income taxation, as the two policy problems are equivalent. 2 Therefore the description presented above applies here, mutatis mutandis. Things start being different if we consider a model with monopolistic competition and no public debt. Under consumption taxation, this inefficiency affects the allocation only through the implementability constraint in (13) (via an increase in γ), but it does not alter the wedge between public and private consumption, which stays at the efficient level independently of . This result is driven by the fact that any change in monopolistic power is absorbed by consumption taxation, which acts as indirect taxation of profits. We call this the intratemporal gain of consumption taxation. This efficiency gain, combined with the log specification of the utility function guarantees that for any change in consumption tax rate, triggered for instance by higher monopolistic power, the substitution and income effect of labour supply are of the same magnitude, thus leaving the ratio between private and public consumption constant.
Finally, also in the case of perfect competition and initial public debt, the Ramsey Planner keeps the ratio of public to private consumption at the First Best level, independently of the initial debt level. This is because consumption taxation acts as a one-time, indirect taxation of the initial level of debt. The
Planner uses this feature by increasing taxes at t = 0, thus reducing the burden of public debt for any t ≥ 1. As a result, the time inconsistency problem is less severe compared to the labour income tax case, and so is the incentive to manipulate the initial bond price and the ratio between private and public consumption. We call this the intertemporal gain of consumption taxation. As for the intratemporal gain, the log specification of the utility function guarantees that for any initial change in consumption tax rate, due to higher b 0 , the substitution and income effect of labour supply are of the same magnitude, thus leaving the ratio between private and public consumption constant. However this policy comes at the cost of a decrease in efficiency in the first period (due to higher taxes in t = 0). From an analytical point of view, this one-off wedge is represented by the term γ 0 κ
Summing up, two main results emerge from this Section. First, the dynamic properties of taxes and bond prices are fundamentally different under the two fiscal financing schemes. Second, the intratemporal and intertemporal efficiency gains of taxing consumption imply that the optimal size of government spending is higher under consumption taxes than under labour income taxes.
Quantitative Analysis
We now turn to numerical methods in order to solve for the optimal fiscal policy mix with and without consumption taxation. We will also quantify the intratemporal and intertemporal welfare gains from taxing consumption. In order to see how the allocations and tax rates behave, we solve a calibrated version of our economy. In what follows we specify the benchmark calibration of the model as well as some alternative parametrisations. To this end, we need to make some further assumptions up front.
The model is calibrated at annual frequency on US data over the period 1995-2010. Data are collected from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). We set the discount factor β to 0.973. This value implies an average annual bond prices of 2.79%. For the benchmark case, we set σ equal to 1 so that the utility is separable in its three arguments, see Section 3.1. We then allow non-separability between public and private consumption by setting σ either to 0.5 (Edgeworth complementarity between g and c) or to 2 (Edgeworth substitutability between g and c). These values are consistent with the empirical findings in Ni (1995) .
For the benchmark case of σ = 1, we set the Frisch elasticity of labour supply equal to 1, a value con-sistent with the survey evidence of Kimball and Shapiro (2008) . The micro and macro literature tend to differ on the estimates of the Frisch elasticity. For this reason we also control the robustness of our results with a wide range of values of ϕ. For consistency, we calibrate κ such that, given the other parameters, households work 27.5 percent of their time endowment in the first best equilibrium. This value implies that in the benchmark Ramsey steady state with labour income tax, households work 25 percent of their time, a value consistent with the average labour supply found in the data.We calibrate the relative utility weight on private consumption, α, such that, given the other parameters, the first best government spending-to-GDP ratio is 16.1 percent. This value implies that in the benchmark Ramsey steady state with labour income tax and consistent with the US for the period 1995-2010, the ratio of government spending to GDP is 15.5 percent. We set the elasticity of substitution among good varieties, , to 6.4
which implies a price mark-up of around 15.6 percent. This value is consistent both with early empirical estimates, e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) , as well as more recent ones, e.g. Epifani and Gancia (2011) and it lies within standard parametrisation adopted in the macroeconomic literature, see inter alia Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2013) . Given how crucial this parameter is in shaping the optimal government spending under the two financing scenarios, we allow this elasticity to vary between 5 and ∞, that correspond to the high mark-up ( = 5) and to perfect competition ( = ∞) cases. Finally, in our benchmark case we fix the initial level of public debt, b 0 so that the share of debt-to-GDP is as in the US over the period of study, i.e. γ b in t = 0 equals 0.64. We then solve for the optimal allocation for different values of debt-to-GDP ratios. The complete description of the parametrisation adopted is reported in Table 1 .
As explained in Section 3, the Ramsey problem can be recast as a two-period problem, at t = 0 and at t ≥ 1, imposing the extra condition that γ −1 = 0. By doing so, one can find the solution to the Ramsey allocation solving a system of non-linear equations and time 0 and for any t ≥ 1, given the initial level of debt, b 0 . 3 3 We try several solution algorithms (non-linear solvers) and all deliver the same results. Table 2 reports the allocations and welfare under the benchmark calibration for the cases of labour income tax and consumption tax, as well as the efficient allocation. Under labour income taxes, the incentive to manipulate bonds prices translates into a decrease in the initial public spending-income ratio, which is set 2 percentage points below its long run level, and a consequent reduction in the initial level of taxes, set as low as 6.1 percent. This policy fosters the demand for saving, and allows the government to sell its bonds at a more convenient price in the first period, i.e. 1.071. All in all, the resulting lower interest rate allows the government to sell its bond at a higher price. At the same time, lower taxes in the initial period push households to postpone leisure. As a result, income in the initial period is around 2 percentage points above its long run level. Finally and consistently with Proposition 2, the public spending income ratio is below the efficient level along the entire transition path.
Under consumption taxation the incentive to manipulate the initial bond prices is lower, as the Ramsey planner can indirectly tax the initial level of wealth via an increase of the tax rate in the initial period.
This policy reduces debt and debt-to-income ratio for any t ≥ 1, thus lowering the need of fiscal revenues in the long run. Since the long-run debt is smaller, the time inconsistency problem under consumption taxation is less severe than under labour income taxation. Higher taxes in the initial period create an incentive to postpone labour supply and consumption. As a result, income is lower in t = 0 than in the subsequent periods. As shown analytically in Proposition 3, under consumption taxation the government spending to income ratio is at the efficient level for the entire transition path.
The dramatic policy differences between the two fiscal financing schemes imply a substantial welfare gain from taxing consumption. It is interesting to note that this gain comes both from the role that consumption taxation has in indirectly taxing profits, thus reducing inefficiency, (intratemporal gains from taxing consumption) and from the dynamic properties of consumption taxation which allows to reduce debt in the long run (intertemporal gains from taxing consumption). In our benchmark calibration, despite the fact that the consumption tax base is smaller than the labour income tax base, taxing consumption rather than labour income can reduce our measure of welfare loss by 20.45 percent. 4 In Table 3 we solve the model with different degrees of monopolistic competition. 5 In order to do so we vary the parameter . For the high monopolistic case we set = 5, a value that implies a markup of 25%. This elasticity is higher than the estimates reported in IO studies, around 3, but lower than elasticities that are consistent with estimates of markup from production function estimates, around 10, see Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2013) . Then we solve the model under perfect competition, i.e. →
∞. This exercise is particularly instructive as it allows to gather a better quantitative insight about the welfare gains of taxing consumption, i.e. intratemporal vs. intertemporal gains. This is because the role of consumption taxes as indirect taxation of profits disappears under perfect competition. Hence the resulting welfare gains of taxing consumption are generated only by the intertemporal dimension. In our parametrisation, the intertemporal gains of taxing consumption amount to 9.1 percent. Differently when monopolistic power is high, i.e. = 5, the role of consumption taxation as an indirect profits tax magnifies (intratemporal gains from taxing consumption). Hence the welfare gains from taxing consumption increases with respect to the benchmark calibration and amount to 22 percent. Moreover it is interesting to see that under labour income tax the share of government spending to total output in the initial period decreases respect to the benchmark case. As explained in Section 3.1, this is due to the negative substitution effect on labour supply generated by the increase in monopolistic competition which pushes the Ramsey planner to reduce public spending. Table 4 presents the results from solving the model for different initial level of debt. This exercise is important, because by varying b 0 and keeping the monopolistic competition at its benchmark value, we can control and in turn shut down the intertemporal gain of taxing consumption. In the limiting case with no initial debt, the Ramsey problem reduces to a static maximisation problem. This case is presented in the top quadrant of Table (4) . Here the gains from taxing consumption are solely given by its role in indirectly taxing profits, i.e. intratemporal gains from taxing consumption, and amount to 19.88%. While both the intertemporal and the intratemporal gains from taxing consumption are sizeable, the intratemporal gains are quantitatively more important.
In the second part of Table 4 we increase the initial debt equal to 120% of GDP, a value that is almost twice as big as in the benchmark calibration. The results follow consistently as expected. Compared to the benchmark, under both tax scenarios, the Ramsey Planner suffers a greater welfare loss and has a stronger incentive to manipulate the initial bond price p b t . Moreover, under labour income taxation, the higher need for fiscal revenues reinforce the substitution effect of labour supply. This pushes the Ramsey planner to lower the government spending to income ratio compared to the benchmark case. In this case, the gains from taxing consumption amount to 25.01%. Table ( 5) presents the allocation and welfare under the alternative parametrisation where σ = 1. In order to be consistent with the benchmark case, we re-calibrate κ and ω g so that in the efficient allocation sp = 0.7 and g sp h sp = 0.2. We keep all the remaining parameters at their benchmark values. The literature has not reached a unanimous consensus on the EIS. To this end, we solve the model with σ = 2, which is consistent with low values of EIS as typically found by the micro literature, see among others Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1994) . We also solve the model with σ = 0.5, a value consistent with some macrofinance literature that finds high values of the EIS, see among others Bansal and Yaron (2004) . Given this parametrisation, the utility function is not longer separable in consumption and leisure. This means among other things, that labour supply decisions directly affect the marginal utility of consumption, and in turn, consumption decisions directly affect the marginal utility of leisure. Despite this, the main message from this experiment does not change qualitatively from the benchmark case. However There are some important quantitative differences. With a low EIS, i.e. σ = 2, the optimal long run level of public spending is higher than the benchmark case and government spendingto-income ratio is higher under consumption taxation than under labour income taxes. Sustaining a bigger government size requires higher taxes in the long run. In turn, higher taxes depress labour supply and consumption, thus decreasing the overall welfare. Interestingly, under labour income taxation, the need for higher taxes in long-run generates a stronger incentive to manipulate the initial bond prices, i.e. p b 0 is bigger when σ = 2 than in the benchmark case. This is due to the fact that with this tax component and a low EIS, it is more difficult to affect initial private consumption through the Euler equation.
Differently, under consumption taxation the Ramsey planner has a weaker incentive to manipulate the initial bond prices compared with the benchmark case. This is because contrary to the labour income tax case, the Ramsey planner can now influence directly the Euler equation via a dynamic pattern of consumption taxes in period zero and in subsequent periods.
Consistently, all these results are reversed when the model is solved with a high EIS. Compared to the benchmark case, the government size is now smaller, taxes are lower and the welfare loss is greatly reduced under both tax scenarios. Remarkably the welfare gains from taxing consumption are very similar across the different EIS experiments and amount to 22.44% when σ = 2 and to 22.82% with σ = 0.5. Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura, 2012) , and (ii) ϕ = 5 as a high value, which is sometimes chosen to better match the intertemporal variation of aggregate hours (e.g. Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés, 2007) . We adjust κ appropriately in each case as described for the benchmark parametrisation. When the Frisch elasticity is low, i.e. ϕ = 0.5, the substitution effect of labour supply is reduced. Thus the policy-maker can sustain the same level of public expenditure and debt at a lower welfare cost. Under labour income tax this implies that the Ramsey Planner can afford to push the public spending-income ratio closer to the first best level without distorting excessively the economy. Of course this result is reversed when the Frisch elasticity of high i.e. ϕ = 5 as the substitution effect of labour supply gets bigger. Differently, under consumption taxation, the policy-maker finds it optimal to keep the government spending to income ratio at the first best regardless of the labour supply elasticity, see Proposition 3. Therefore the economy is facing a higher welfare loss when the Frisch elasticity is high compared to when the Frisch elasticity is low. The gains from taxing consumption are roughly the same under the two different parametrisations and amount to around 22.4%.
Finally, in Table (7) we explore the possibility that public and private consumption are complements or substitutes in the Edgeworth sense. This is achieved by varying α ∈ [−0.5, 0.5], whereas a positive value implies substitutability and a negative one complementarity. In the former case, an increase in government spending decreases the marginal utility of consumption. This weakens the income effect of labour supply and the increases the EIS. Ceteris paribus, a lower income effect means that the substitution effect becomes relatively stronger. Compared to the benchmark case, this implies a stronger distortionary effect of taxation that in turn pushes the Ramsey Planner to reduce government spending-toincome ratio. Under labour income tax, the incentive to reduce public consumption is more pronounced than under consumption taxation, although under both fiscal scenarios the government spending-toincome ratio fall short of its first best. Furthermore, given the substitutability between private and public consumption, the reduction of public spending is compensated by the increase in private consumption and this leads to a lower welfare loss. The gains from taxing consumption reduces to 17.81%.
Conversely, with α = −0.5, an increase in government spending increases the marginal utility of consumption. This weakens the income effect of labour supply and the increases the EIS. A higher income effect decreases the distortionary effects of taxation thus pushing the Ramsey Planner to increase government spending-to-income ratio. This ratio is only marginally higher under consumption taxation, and under both fiscal scenarios the government spending-to-income ratio is higher than their first best counterparts. In turn the lower allocation of resources to private consumption implies, compared to the benchmark a higher welfare loss and a higher welfare gain from taxing consumption (24.22%). 
Concluding Remarks
Consumption taxation has been widely used by governments around the globe as a source of fiscal revenues. For example, as of August 2016, the value-added tax on standard items ranges from 17 (Luxembourg) to 27 (Hungary) percent in European Union countries. We consider a simple economy characterised by infinitely lived representative households with love for public goods, a perfect competitive labour market and a monopolistic competitive goods market. In this general environment, our analysis shows that taxing consumption, compared to taxing labour income, allows the policy-maker to sustain both higher public spending and higher aggregate welfare. We are able to disentangle two effects through which consumption taxation overtake income taxes. First, consumption taxation serves as an indirect taxation of the inefficient profits produced by the non competitive markets. This beneficial effect increases with the assumed firms' market power and disappears under perfect competition.
Second, given the intertemporal structure of consumption behaviour, taxing consumption allows the policy-maker to directly manipulate households' Euler equation in order to favourably influence the price of public debt. This effect increases with the size of public debt. We we find that both effects are quantitatively important in an economy calibrated to replicate some salient features of the US economy.
